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COMMENTARIES II
REMARKS OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT E. KEETON*
Professor Cooper's excellent and thoughtful paper suggests
avenues of speculation about the future that are both numerous
and significant. I am torn between barely noting many and se-
lecting just one or two for closer (although I will not say strict)
scrutiny. The following are some of the issues and controversies
arising from mass litigation that we will be forced to address
sooner or later.
First, are our current substantive and procedural laws capa-
ble of dealing with claims arising from these kinds of human
events? As illustrations, consider just three subquestions:
(1) Can current law deal adequately with claims of cause in
fact relation between wrongful conduct and claimed harm? Is
the drug, or the product, or the activity-whatever kind of activ-
ity it is and whether we think of the action as a tort case or a
commercial case or a price fixing case-capable of causing the
kind of harm that the claim asserts? If so, did it actually cause
the kind of harm to each of the many plaintiffs who are parties
to this action or who are members of a plaintiff class that is
sought to be certified? To what extent in determining answers to
these so-called questions of fact may the fact finder, whether
jury or court, base inferences on, for example, epidemiological
evidence showing significant correlation between allegedly tor-
tious conduct and the incidence of disease in the population of
the allegedly affected community? In dealing with those ques-
tions, the impartial mind is attracted to alternatives to all-or-
nothing joint-and-several liability rules, where everything turns
on a single, more-probable-than-not finding. We are currently
developing exotic variations on alternative and proportional lia-
bility and proportional contribution. We are doing so in an effort
to deal with some of the relatively less complex litigation cur-
rently being presented to our courts, in the search for more re-
* Judge, United States District Court for the District of Masschusetts. B.B.A., 1940;
LL.B., 1941, University of Texas; S.J.D., 1956, Harvard University.
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fined justice. Are our present interdependent rules of substan-
tive and procedural law well designed for use in answering these
kinds of questions in more massive litigation? If not, who should
be doing what to improve them?
(2) Are our current substantive and procedural laws capable
of dealing with claims of entitlement to a remedy for increasing
one's susceptibility to disease or other harm, or, conversely
stated, reducing one's likelihood of escaping harm within a given
time period or a given context? A bare handful of decisions in
recent years have begun to address this kind of question. For
example, an expert witness testifies in the trial court that before
the patient was exposed to an unreasonably hazardous drug, the
patient had no better than a forty percent chance of living
longer than three years and that the exposure to the drug re-
duced the chance of living at least three years to twenty-five
percent. When the patient dies two years later, what are the ap-
plicable substantive and procedural rules? Do we accept the de-
fendant's contention that the claim fails because it cannot be
proved that, more probably than not, the patient would have
been alive three years hence but for use of the drug or do we
fashion some modification of law, of procedure, or both? Do we
allow recovery, and, if so, in what amount? For example, do we
allow recovery for the full measure of damages in wrongful death
actions or for fifteen percent of that amount as compensation for
the fifteen percent reduction of the chance of survival, or do we
adopt some other measure taking into account that death was
always certain and only the time of death was in doubt? What
rules can we fashion that will deal adequately, and at reasonable
adjudication costs, with all the many patients who used that
hazardous drug before it was ultimately removed from the mar-
ket for the stated reason by the manufacturer that projected lia-
bility insurance costs had become prohibitive?
(3) How shall we make use of and avoid abuse of expert tes-
timony? I have been deeply troubled by abuses with respect to
expert testimony in today's ordinary litigation where the oppor-
tunities for detecting and deterring abuse call for less sophistica-
tion on the part of lawyers and judges than will be required in
more massive litigation of all types-including securities frauds,
price fixing conspiracies, and other complex commercial cases, as
well as disasters more massive than plane crashes and dangerous
prescriptions. How will we control abuses in these more complex
[Vol. 38
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cases and at what cost and sacrifices of other valued interests?
How did that expert in the hypothetical arrive at the rather pre-
cise estimate of forty percent chance of survival before, twenty-
five percent after, and, therefore, fifteen percent reduction of
chance of survival for the stated length of time? Why three
years rather than two or five or ten? Should the trial judge have
allowed the jury to hear such expert testimony? These are ques-
tions being presented in trial courts today. How much more dif-
ficult will be the questions in the year 2011, 2036, and 2086?
I have been puzzled about something else on this program:
the progressing willingness, as the conference has proceeded, to
project into the future. A moment ago, I think I got the clue to
the reason: The group of commentators that are younger are
more willing to project into the future. Before I conclude, I will
go further than anybody else so far. The subquestions I have
stated are just a few illustrations of subquestions related to spe-
cific areas of the law.
Let us consider a second major question: Will controversies
arising from mass disasters produce such stress on our legal sys-
tem as to force attention not only to the problems of substantive
and procedural law Professor Cooper noted,1 but also attention
to proposals for intrusive and rigorous regulations of adversary
presentation if, indeed, we succeed in preserving adversary trial?
We already have rules and practices as to whether multiple par-
ties, some of whom appeal the result of a six-month trial, may
have more than fifteen minutes each to argue on appeal. Must
we, for example, also develop rules, practices, and standards
under which trial courts decide whether the parties will be al-
lowed only six weeks or six days, instead of six months? Those
questions will be decided by the courts, not the parties.
This kind of question calls. attention to a deeper truth.
Neither substantive nor procedural law, as taught in law schools
and treated in statutes and court opinions, nor the two com-
bined, tell us the whole story about the law in action-the law as
it comes to bear in the actual resolution of controversies. These
rules, in aggregate, do not even tell us the whole story about the
small percentage 'of the controversies resolved by authoritative
decisions, much less the ninety percent (and this percentage is
1. See, e.g., Cooper, supra pp. 491-93.
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increasing, I think, because of lack of resources for dispute reso-
lution) that are resolved by settlement or other nondecisional
disposition.
The dramatically higher costs of administering increasingly
refined rules of substantive and procedural law will underscore
the contrast between law in theory and law in action. The con-
trast may be so stark, so compelling, that it persuades law teach-
ers to pay more attention to it as they try to help even first year
students understand the law.
Now, a third major question: To what extent do the pres-
sures toward what Professor Cooper has aptly called "unitary
consideration to avoid repetitive litigation ' 2 also push toward
one national law and one national system of dispute resolution?
Will one national substantive law replace multistate substantive
law in mass disaster cases? Will one national procedural law re-
place multistate procedural law for truly national or even inter-
national disasters to person and property? On the other hand,
how forceful will be the very clear pressures to serve interests in
local autonomy as to governing law and interests in hometown
dispute resolution?
A fourth major question: How will we adjust our fact-find-
ing functions to adjudicate claims arising from mass disasters?
Professor Cooper calls attention to the interdependence of pro-
cedural rules and rules of claim preclusion and issue preclusion.3
There is also a further interdependence with rules regarding who
makes the fact findings, and how these findings are made. Will
fact findings bearing upon legal responsibility for mass disasters
be treated as adjudicative and thus binding only under rules of
res judicata, or, if you prefer, issue preclusion and claim preclu-
sion, or instead treated as not adjudicative and thus as binding
precedents under the doctrine of stare decisis? For example, is a
finding in a particular case that Product X is or is not carcino-
genic a nonadjudicative finding and binding under stare decisis,
or is it instead an adjudicative finding binding only to the extent
determined by the law of claim preclusion and issue preclusion?
Will judges and juries make these kinds of findings in the same
manner they make findings on adjudicative fact questions by
considering and weighing evidence offered in the trial court, in-
2. See generally id. at pp. 503-06.
3. Id. at p. 493.
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cluding expert opinions, or will courts, both trial and appellate,
determine that a product is or is not carcinogenic on the basis of
library research rather than being confined to the record of evi-
dence offered by the particular adversaries in the trial court?
Consider a final major question that cuts across all the other
questions and subquestions of which I have spoken. It is a ques-
tion about law reform, law revision, evaluation, or improvement,
however you want to express it. Must current allocations of
power and responsibility, both authorizations and constraints
with respect to what institutions and what individuals shall or
may participate in law reform activities and lawmaking, be re-
considered to forestall utter failure of the present legal system?
Will it be necessary not only that the law change, but that we
change our views about how changes in the law may properly be
accomplished? Will changes in this respect be ultimately neces-
sary to forestall what might be termed, not in a pejorative but in
an institutional sense, a political decision to substitute a totally
different set of institutions and procedures for dealing with mass
disaster claims, thus rendering obsolete all our concerns about
procedural and substantive niceties?
Professor Cooper emphasized the interdependence of sub-
stantive and procedural law.4 His point may be extended to an
interdependence of both substantive and procedural law reform
with institutional issues regarding all law reform. We have long
had codes of professional conduct for lawyers. More recently, we
have developed codes of judicial conduct for judges with some
being very restrictive about judges' participation in law reform
activities. We have no code of professional responsibility for
statutory drafting. We do not even have a tradition comparable
to that developed in the American Law Institute and the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to
apply to the people who do most of our statutory drafting. In-
deed, much, if not most of it, is done by distinctly partisan
drafters whose aim is to serve the special interest group they
represent. We must develop wiser and better rules and tradi-
tions of professionalism in law reform if we are to meet the chal-
lenges of the next hundred years. This, I submit, is, if not the
most important issue addressed in this conference, at least the
4. Id. at p. 491.
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issue to be primarily addressed.
As a postlude to my comments on Professor Cooper's
thoughtful and suggestive paper, I shall yield just a little more
to the impulse to predict. I now propose to cast myself in the
role of law clerk preparing a draft opinion for use by a trial
judge sometime in that future about which Professor Cooper
stimulates us to speculate. I ask you to imagine yourself to be
my fellow law clerk. Casting ourselves in these roles will free us
to be a little bolder, if not reckless, about seeing into the future.
Even so, thinking a whole century ahead is so daunting as to be
unnerving, if not causing us to act unwittingly. Therefore, let us
imagine we are just halfway there-it is the year 2036.
The trial judge for whom we are writing a draft is a senior
district judge designated to sit on the newly created national tri-
bunal for mass dispute resolution. The only judges who sit on
this court are senior district judges and senior circuit judges
with trial experience. The reason for this seemingly odd arrange-
ment is that even after the compelling need for creation of such
a central national court to resolve disputes arising from massive
cases that are national in scope came to be recognized, it re-
mained politically impractical to create a new court of perhaps
as many as fifteen to twenty-five judges and allow all those ap-
pointments to be made by just one President. Eventually, in the
year 2025, a compromise bill was passed that authorized the
chief judge of each circuit to designate two judges of senior sta-
tus whose names would go into a panel from which a computer
would pick at random the judge to whom a newly filed mass dis-
aster case would be assigned, or, of course, to whom a previously
filed case would be reassigned whenever a case outlived a judge.
The first problem that this draft opinion addresses is how to
define the plaintiff class and how to define the defendant class.
We imagine that we work for a very pragmatic, down-to-earth
trial judge who always looks for a practical solution to his cases.
He wants to be sure to do justice, but also to be sure to do it
within his lifetime. Here is the draft opinion:
In this action the plaintiffs ask the court to certify them as
representatives of a class consisting of every person, any of
whose parents or grandparents were alive from on or about No-
vember 1986 to on or about November 2006. This is a twenty-
year period during which, plaintiffs allege, it has later been sci-
entifically determined that the seeds of a national disaster were
540 [Vol. 38
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sown by activities that so depleted the ozone that in time it
ceased to shield the parents and grandparents of the plaintiff
class from genetic damage caused by solar radiation. It is alleged
these activities proximately caused every member of the plaintiff
class to be in some respect, to put the point bluntly, defective.
The plaintiffs name as defendants the United States of
America and each of its sovereign states in existence within the
relevant time period, the number having reached sixty-four by
the year 2006. Plaintiffs further pray that the court certify a
class of additional defendants, all public and private corpora-
tions, all individuals and other legal entities, if any, who were
during any part of those fateful years 1986 through 2006 in any
way engaged in the manufacture or marketing of the products
that contributed to the depletion of the ozone. Plaintiffs also
pray that the court include in the class of defendants all persons
and entities who were during that period in any way engaged in
the use of any of those products. This prayer is supported by the
allegation that users aided and abetted manufacturers and mar-
keters in causing this mass tort by providing a market that in-
duced them to commit the wrong.
Finally, plaintiffs pray that in recognition of and by analogy
to the recently expanded concepts of successor liability, spawned
to deal with efforts of defendants to escape liability through
bankruptcies, takeovers, and mergers, the court should also in-
clude in the defendant class all entities and individuals who
have succeeded to the interest of each manufacturer, marketer,
or user of any of the injury-causing products.
That, briefly stated, is the essence of the complaint. How
shall this court respond to it?
It is, of course, the first obligation of this court to determine
whether the claim stated is one within the limited jurisdiction of
this recently created court, which extends only to cases that are
too massive and complex for adjudication by ordinary processes,
including those processes elucidated in the now ten-volume
manual for complex multidistrict litigation.
As any observer can readily appreciate, this case has the po-
tential for being far too complex for ordinary processes. There-
fore, in this instance, subject matter jurisdiction cannot be
doubted.
A second question that arises is whether the proposed plain-
tiff and defendant classes are sufficiently defined to be identifi-
1987]
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able with reasonable certitude. Defendants object that it would
take years for the court to determine who among all of the natu-
ral persons in existence in the United States had at least one
parent or grandparent alive during the twenty year period in
question and whose genetic damage might be found to be a
proximate cause of the putative class members' present condi-
tion. I conclude, however, that as a practical matter, this is no
problem.
First, guided by precedents regarding successor liability and
their bearing upon membership in the defendant class, I con-
clude that the defendant class of users and successors to users
includes every individual and entity in existence. Thus, the de-
fendant class is universal.
It has been suggested in argument that jurisdiction over a
class so broad is defeated by the absence of indispensable par-
ties who are all other persons in existence, or at least all those
existing on this planet Earth. For reasons stated below, I happily
conclude that I need not address this troubling question.
At first blush, it might be thought that a difficulty remains
in identifying members of the plaintiff class. On deeper reflec-
tion, however, I conclude that this, too, is no problem in this
practical matter. The reason is that before enough years have
passed to complete this litigation and enter judgment on the
merits, all persons born too soon to be in the plaintiff class will
have died. Borrowing a maxim from ancient equity doctrine and
translating it into modern terms, equity will not engage in futil-
ity. By the time this case could reach judgment, it might better
be restyled as the case of Everybody v. Everybody, a case that
makes Jarndyce v. Jarndyce5 seem child's play for a day. For
this federal court to exercise jurisdiction over such a case would
be even worse, as an extension of jurisdiction beyond that con-
ferred by Constitution and statute, than, for example, resolving
family law disputes that are reserved to state and local
tribunals.
Whether the inevitable legal results should be reasoned on
grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of a case or
controversy, or mootness, I leave to those who are wiser, better-
informed, and more authoritative as to what trial judges should
5. See C. DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (Penguin 1971) (London 1853).
[Vol. 38
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do. Whatever the correct legal theory may be, the result clearly
must be:
Case dismissed. So ordered.
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REMARKS OF THE HONORABLE CONSTANCE B. MOTLEY*
As you all know, a comedian is a hard act to follow. I feel
quite at home as the last speaker. As you probably realize, I
have a job that requires me to listen to men talk all day long,
and then I have the last word. I want to first congratulate Dean
Cooper on his excellent paper, which delineated the problems in
this area. As he suggested, none of us can really foresee what is
going to happen ten years from now, let alone a hundred years
from now. Personally, I feel confident that the corps of lawyers
we now have in the country will be able to devise ways and
means for us to deal with the present crisis in our courts.
In addition to the general increase in litigation that we have
experienced in the federal courts in the last twenty-five years,
there now appears to be an increasing number of complex cases.
By that I mean multiparty, multi-issue litigation, such as the as-
bestos cases in our bankruptcy court s the Agent Orange cases in
the Eastern District of New York,7 Union Carbide's India toxic
tort case,8 which was initially filed in our court, and cases such
as the LTV bankruptcy,9 which is the largest bankruptcy in the
history of the United States.
One unexpected development, at least from my point of
view, is that no one expected the Johns Manville Company to
file bankruptcy in our court and, of course, the bankruptcy
courts simply are not equipped to deal with many more massive
cases of this kind. We only have six bankruptcy judges in New
York, and the bankruptcy judge has even less supporting per-
sonnel than does the district court judge. These cases force the
bankruptcy judge to consider future claims-a brand new type
of claim in our jurisprudence, and one that arises out of toxic
tort cases. This type of claim is made, for example, by people
* Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
A.B., 1943, New York University; LL.B., 1946, Columbia University.
6. In re Johns-Manville Corp., Nos. 82B 11,656 to 82B 11,676 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.,
filed Aug. 26, 1982).
7. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) (proposed settlement of $180 million tentatively approved).
8. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December,
1984, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (consolidated case dismissed on grounds of forum
non conveniens).
9. See, e.g., In re Chateaugay Corp., 64 Bankr. 990 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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who are now working in the asbestos industry and whose asbes-
tosis has not yet developed, but will twenty or thirty years from
now. The bankruptcy judge in our court who has the Johns
Manville case before him has had to devise a plan to try to reor-
ganize Johns Manville and settle this litigation by setting up a
fund that takes into account claims unrealized at this time.
In my view, the solution should lie more with Congress and
the state legislatures. For example, Congress could establish a
national fund, which can be built by taxing toxic tort industries.
A system resembling workers' compensation or no-fault insur-
ance can be devised; hopefully, such a system would take this
problem out of the courts altogether. Since these disputes are
largely about money and who is going to get how much and
when, any national legislative program of that kind will have to
take into consideration how much the lawyers are going to get.
Unless lawyers are eliminated altogether by the system that is
devised, this certainly is one consideration.
My counterpart in the Eastern District, Jack Weinstein, re-
cently settled the Agent Orange cases. If I remember the figures
correctly, the lawyers involved in those cases wanted ninety mil-
lion dollars. He gave them nine million dollars. Everyone
thought the case was settled, but I understand that some law-
yers were not satisfied with the settlement and have now asked
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to review the case.
One would have thought that the Second Circuit would never
want to see the case, but there it is in the court of appeals after
years in the district court. The case was so massive that Chief
Judge Weinstein had to assign a magistrate in that court to work
on it full-time. I understand that that magistrate recently left
and has gone to Wall Street, where she can make ten times what
a federal magistrate makes.
At the state level, of course, state legislatures can take ac-
tion, and it appears that they already have. The latest informa-
tion that I have indicates thirty-four states have now enacted
laws to help solve the liability crisis, which exists in the country
as a result of these cases. Let me read the latest information on
this from a publication called Business Insurance: "Galvanized
by the liability insurance crisis, an unprecedented drive to re-
form the nation's civil justice system is sweeping state legisla-
tures. Thirty-four states have enacted tort reform measures to
reduce liability exposure and make insurance more available and
1987]
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affordable for businesses, professionals, governmental entities
and nonprofit organizations.' 10 In all, thirty-six states have
passed tort reform measures; but in Arizona the governor has
vetoed at least a portion of the package, and the governor of
Illinois has yet to sign the law. The article points out that only
nine states have passed what experts say is significant reform
legislation; in one of those states, Florida, insurers are protesting
the linking of reforms to insurance rate rollbacks, and the legis-
lation appears to be decreasing rather than increasing the availa-
bility of insurance. Caps have been put on damage awards, but
the amount of the caps varies greatly. In Michigan, for example,
they put a cap as low as $225,000 for noneconomic damages in
medical malpractice cases. In Kansas, they put a cap of
$1,000,000 in the same area. State legislatures have already be-
gun to grapple with the situation, and, I suspect, within the next
decade or so, significant legislation dealing with this problem
will be firmly in place.
In the interim, however, the burden is on the courts. In the
federal courts, as you probably know, we have had the multidis-
trict panel for a number of years. This is a panel of judges that
meets periodically to decide which federal judge before whom
one of these mass cases has been filed will supervise all of the
pretrial discovery. All of the cases in other districts are stayed
while that pretrial discovery process moves forward. It is, of
course, expected that pretrial discovery conducted in that man-
ner will cut down on expenses and delays and will be of benefit
to everyone who is making a similar claim. That device is al-
ready in place and, as far as I know, it has been successful.
As a way of dealing with commercial cases, some courts
have adopted compulsory arbitration requirements, at least as a
prerequisite to proceeding any further with the trial. In our
court, we have a coercive rule. It is not compulsory. In cases in-
volving less than $50,000, the judge has the duty to suggest to
lawyers that they proceed to arbitration before a panel set up by
the American Arbitration Association. If the arbitration is not
successful, they can come back. I understand that in Michigan
there is a similar plan, which is compulsory. This is another de-
vice that courts have had to implement to try to deal with the
10. Geisel & Taravella, Tort Reform Explodes, Bus. INs., Aug. 18, 1986, at 22.
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existing caseload they have.
In addition, we now have a new civil rule in the federal
court, rule 16, adopted a couple of years ago, which requires the
judge to hold a pretrial conference within four months of the
filing of a lawsuit and set a pretrial discovery schedule.1 I think
that that has been a very significant development because it
forces the lawyers, at a very early stage in the case, to get down
to business and decide whether this is a case in which time and
money ought to be invested. That rule, together with new civil
rule 11, which imposes sanctions on lawyers for frivolous litiga-
tion,'2 will go a long way toward getting rid of a lot of cases in
the federal court.
As I indicated previously, one of the things that is needed is
more staff support on the district court level. I expect that in
time we will get some help in that area. If we had more help by
way of an additional law clerk and a courtroom deputy whose
job it is to keep up with the judge's calendar and to calendar
things for the judges, we would be able to handle more expedi-
tiously a lot of the cases that currently crowd our dockets. I
think that a number of the appeals that are taken in civil cases
result from the fact that the judge has not had the time to
devote to ferreting out carefully the issues and writing an ex-
planatory opinion. The days when we could do that seem to be
gone forever.
If we are to deal with these problems, a look has to be taken
at the lack of supporting personnel in the district court. In the
Second Circuit (I do not know about other circuits), the judges
long ago devised a method for decreasing the number of appeals
that they actually have to hear. A court officer was appointed so
that every appeal that is filed is subject to a kind of preargu-
ment settlement conference; that has done much to cut down on
the number of appeals that the court of appeals actually has to
hear because, as you know, many appeals are frivolous and this
is the stage at which those appeals should be handled.
We have done some other things in our court in an attempt
to deal with our increasing caseload. We have about 2000 pro se
cases a year, many of which come from prisoners. Everyone in
New York is "street wise" in that they know they can go into the
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
12. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
1987]
13
et al.: Commentaries II
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
federal court, and Judge Motley or some other judge will hear
this pro se complaint of theirs. We have a pro se clerk who helps
them to write the complaint out so we can read it and make
some sense out of it. At times, the pro se clerk will send a docu-
ment back to a prisoner and ask him: "Would you tell us
whether you have exhausted your state remedies as to this, that,
or the other?" We find that having the pro se clerk in those in-
stances has helped considerably. The pro se clerk also ferrets
out totally meritless claims and writes a memorandum on such
claims that I, as the Chief Judge, must sign. After the pro se
clerk has written the memo, it is reviewed by a magistrate and
then it comes to me. My law clerks look at it, and then I sign my
name. Of course, if it is reversed, it is Judge Motley who is re-
versed, but we have not had any reversals thus far. We have
been dismissing outright totally frivolous claims through that
device and, after much begging of the administrative office, we
now have two pro se clerks. Of course, we are begging for a third
clerk. But these are the kinds of things that the courts have to
do on their own while they await some legislative action by the
Congress or by state legislators to help out with this problem.
We have also established a panel of lawyers that can be as-
signed to pro se civil litigants. This is in addition to a panel of
lawyers who are assigned under the Criminal Justice Act to re-
present indigent defendants.13 The lawyers on the civil litigation
panel are largely volunteers from the Wall Street firms; they are
young, enthusiastic, idealistic new associates who have not yet
become jaded by the system, and who still have their idealism
intact. These lawyers on the panel are assigned to a case after a
judge has looked at the pro se complaint and decided that it
may have merit, and that the way to get this case moving is to
have a lawyer assigned for that purpose. That is something we
have also developed in the Southern District, which I think has
been tremendously helpful in helping us dispose of our caseload.
We also have another program in the nature of continuing
legal education. We have seven law schools in the New York
City area alone, so we have plenty of legal talent. We have law
professors who volunteer to teach lawyers who are going to han-
dle Social Security disability cases and cases in other areas of
13, See Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)-(c) (1982).
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the law that are repetitive but take some time to handle unless
one specializes in that area. I think our population is getting
older so we have more age discrimination cases than we have
race discrimination cases. In any event, these are specialized ar-
eas and require specialization. So, we have law professors who
work with the lawyers in making sure that the lawyers who are
going to represent these people are competent to do so by teach-
ing them the basic substantive law in the area.
To close, I would like to repeat what I said earlier in this
Symposium. I have every confidence that with the legal re-
sources and institutions now in place, we can devise whatever
methods, techniques, or strategies may be required to enable us
to deal with this problem until we get some higher authority,
such as the Congress, to rescue us.
15
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